September 9, 2002

Pathways to Empire

By Ronnie D. Lipschutz

For months prior to the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., strategists and policy planners in the Bush administration were already set on asserting U.S. hegemony in world affairs.

Their well-publicized distaste for multilateral commitments and the rule of international law, their constant drum-beating on behalf of ballistic missile defense, and their advocacy of American military dominance all pointed toward a unilateralist foreign policy.

What was lacking was a rationale for acting on the new strategy. That arrived, somewhat fortuitiously, when the three jets hit their targets.

During the year since, there have been no terrorist actions of comparable magnitude, although we are frequently assured that many have been foiled. As a result, the "War on Terrorism" has languished and the strategy of pre-emptive attacks has come to seem risky, if not downright dangerous, to many people, especially across the European Union.

Although the governments of Europe are all fearful of terrorism, their individual reactions to the threat vary rather widely. The British scrutinize everyone closely; the French are much less concerned. But what few understand is the Bush administration's strategy. What is the logic of going after Iraq, and where is the evidence for doing so?

Terrorists, as has been pointed out repeatedly, are a problematic threat for geopolitical strategizing. They might be everywhere, plotting, organizing, and acting, but they rarely congregate in sufficient numbers to present viable targets for modern militaries (Afghanistan was an exception proving this rule). States, by contrast, possess fixed assets--which is one reason why terrorists attack states in preference to each other--and these can be targeted and destroyed.

All of this illuminates both the "Axis of Evil" and the administration's eagerness to go to Baghdad. Whether Saddam Hussein represents a threat to global security will only become apparent if and when weapons of mass destruction are used or uncovered following an invasion.

In the meantime, however, the viability of American unilateralism requires a demonstration that it can keep world order and pre-empt disorder. Indeed, whether Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, has connections with Al-Qaeda, or presents a danger to global security comparable to Nazi Germany is almost beside the point. The national interest rests on America's ability to maintain order through demonstrations of hegemony, and not on the existence or absence of material evidence of a threat.

Many people think an invasion of Iraq would be an irrational act, given the associated uncertainties and the possibility of massive American casualties. Yet, there is a long history of U.S. brinksmanship, the "threat that leaves something to chance" as game theorist and economist Thomas Schelling once put it. Schelling described the game of "chicken" as one example of this strategy: make credible threats and do not hesitate to act in such a way as to put fear into your opponent.

Richard Nixon was one of the great practitioners of this approach to foreign affairs. During the Paris peace negotiations in the early 1970s, Henry Kissinger was reputed to have warned the North Vietnamese delegation that Nixon was, basically, a "madman." One could not depend on the president to not do something crazy, said the Secretary of State, so the Vietnamese should come to an agreement before the president did something irrational. (Ironically, perhaps, the "madman theory of deterrence" appears to have been the work of Daniel Ellsberg.) No one really believed that Nixon was crazy, but who was willing to take the risk, however small? It did nothing to reassure people when the evidence later emerged that Nixon might be somewhat unstable.

Has the Bush White House taken a leaf from Nixon's playbook? Are the warnings of invasion intended to scare people and make them behave? Is Bush crazy or calculating? The war scare is certainly having an effect in Europe and the Arab world and, from the evidence, in Congress, as well. The effect on Baghdad is, so far, much less clear. If, however, talk and mobilization do not do the trick, Washington will have to follow through and attack, regardless of support from other countries.

If the United States does succeed in going it alone--or substantially alone--it will mark the beginning of a new geopolitical era after hegemony, that of American Empire. What kind of "peace" such an empire will bring is anyone's guess.

Return to Front Page